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Abstract. This paper critically examines the character, development and implementation of 
master plans as vehicles of urban change. The case of Sheffield’s city centre master planning 
is used to analyse how the city was reimagined from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, and 
how the economic, cultural, social and political dimensions of urban regeneration were 
addressed. The paper argues that, in comparison to the postwar, welfare-state master plans, 
the master plans of the neoliberal period had a narrower spatial and thematic focus, linking 
place qualities to economic considerations, to be delivered through real estate investment. As 
such, social considerations were marginalized and, when a major economic crisis occurred, the 
new generation master plans’ lack of flexibility and vulnerability to economic fluctuations 
became apparent, much the same as their predecessors. This shows how master plans can be 
effective instruments for mobilizing investment and coordinating development around a 
selective spatial vision in periods of economic growth, but their utility is severely curtailed in 
economic downturns, when their coordinative potential is much diminished. They run the risk 
of becoming top-down technical devices to coordinate speculative real estate investment, 
without durable connections to the local economic and social capacities and needs.   
 
Around the turn of the century, British cities went through a period of intense transformation, which was 
branded an urban renaissance (Urban Task Force, 1999). One of the key instruments of this 
transformation was the master plan, aimed at steering the large-scale and complex processes of 
change (Bell, 2005). While some master plans were linked to the aftermath of a catastrophic event, 
such as the bombing of central Manchester, most were parts of fundamental shifts in the national urban 
economic and social trajectories. Although widely used in British urban regeneration, master plans were 
not limited to any particular type of function or place, as evidenced by many examples from around the 
world (Falk, 2011; Ganis et al, 2014; Firley and Grön, 2013; Williams,2000; Science Museum, 2016; 
Oxford University, 2008; City of Baltimore, 2006). Despite their differences, they all shared the feature 
of being an instrument of coordinating various development activities towards a spatial vision for an 
area. They reflected a new approach to the management of urban change, in line with the 
circumstances of the neoliberal age.  
 
In this paper, the authors analyse a major British city centre, as a basis for a critical examination of the 
idea of master planning and its role in urban transformation. The paper is organized in three parts. The 
first part analyses the changing concept and character of master plans, in their political and economic 
contexts, and in their similarities with, and differences from, the previous wave of master planning in 
the welfare state period. The second part analyses the case of master plans in Sheffield city centre, the 
context of their production, and their changing character in five phases over a period of over two 
decades. The final part examines the impact of these master planning efforts on Sheffield, as a platform 
for the evaluation of master plans as a whole. The paper is based on the authors’ involvement in a 
major international research project into design, planning, innovation and spatial quality (Segers et al, 
2016). 
 
1. The changing nature of master planning 
Since the mid-twentieth century, two major waves of master planning can be identified, both as 
instruments of managing growth. The first wave, immediately after the Second World War, saw the 
master plan as a comprehensive effort to envisage and control the future shape of a city (Ward, 2002). 
The nineteenth century ideas of the good city had given way to two influential spatial visions: the 
modernist radical vision, with its trust in transport and construction technologies and its belief in 
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functionalist reorganization of the city (Le Corbusier, 1929), and the reformist vision of small towns as 
an alternative to the large city (Howard, 1902). The drive for reconstruction after the war, and the 
emergence of the welfare state as a new political economic framework, provided the opportunity for the 
implementation of these visions, deploying the master plan for opening up the urban space to the cars 
and reorganizing its land use on a functionalist basis.  
 
The postwar plans reflected a spirit of optimism, which lasted for a generation, confident in its ability to 
eradicate the urban problems through functionality and creativity, combining ‘beauty and utility’, as 
expressed in the Manchester Plan of 1945 (Nicholas, 1945:7). Major cities were to be decentralized 
and transformed, as exemplified in the London plans of 1943 and 1944 (Forshaw and Abercrombie, 
1943; Abercrombie, 1945), and a series of master plans were developing for satellite new towns 
(Osborn and Whittick, 1963). Master plans were instruments of radical spatial transformation, thought 
to address longstanding social and economic problems. 
 
Within three decades, however, the postwar period of prosperity and its building boom ended, the 
welfare state started to decline, and the first wave of master planning came to a halt. Rather than long-
term plans, it was argued that city planning and design should take place in adjustable increments 
(Lindblom, 1959; Alexander et al, 1987), ending the idea of making a comprehensive effort to shape 
the future through physical transformation (Friedmann, 1987). The plans were also critiqued for their 
design-based character, their production of maps and drawings, which made them ‘inflexible and 
basically inapplicable’, static and unable to cope with the rapid pace of urban change (Perloff, 1956: 
199-200). The process of master planning, typically undertaken by private consultants, was criticized 
for being outside of mainstream political process and administration and with little citizen participation. 
Even after their integration into the work of municipalities for linking them more flexibly to the city 
councils’ political strategies and administrative procedures, the plans remained technocratic. They were 
accused of reflecting the values and preferences of the elite, over-confident in its own logic, and 
therefore adopting a condescending attitude towards the others and towards the past (Gans, 1968; 
Jacobs, 1961).  
 
The first wave of master plans, therefore, coincided with the rise of the welfare state, which used them 
as technical instruments to address social and economic problems through top-down spatial 
transformation. These instruments, however, were growth-oriented and unable to cope with the radical 
changes that unfolded from the mid-1960s onwards.  
 
The second wave of master planning started with the neoliberal phase in the 1980s, with a drive for the 
regeneration of deindustrialized urban economies, which triggered a new rise in city building activities, 
now requiring coordination and creative skills (Madanipour,2006). The emergence of urban design 
coincided and overlapped with the reintroduction of spatial and strategic concerns in planning as the 
primary form of urban regeneration (Lynch, 1981; Jacobs and Appleyard, 1987). In this context, master 
plans returned, not as a blueprint for the entire city and its range of social and economic problems, as 
comprehensive planning had previously claimed, but as a tool for managing strategic urban projects 
with a primarily economic rationale (Oosterlynck et al, 2011; Albrechts, 2017).  
 
The resurgence of the master plan in its new form happened alongside neoliberal deregulation, 
reduction in the size and scope of the state, and the shift of emphasis from government to governance 
(Williams, 2000). Around the turn of the century, a long period of technology-enabled and debt-fuelled 
economic growth facilitated high levels of public investment in the built environment. Privatization and 
globalization had multiplied and diversified the non-state actors in urban development, and now there 
was a need for the coordination of these diverse actors through place-based visions and governance. 
This is why the term master plan has been interchangeably used with development framework, 
regeneration strategy, urban design framework, or vision (CABE, 2004: 13), providing a platform around 
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which the stakeholders could collaborate. In the new market-driven paradigm, it was a tool with which 
to manage risk and uncertainty, even if it obscured the lines of democratic accountability (Wright, 2003).  
 
Set up by the government to facilitate the renaissance of British cities, and led by the architect Richard 
Rogers, the Urban Task Force advocated the use of spatial master plans for a design-led regeneration. 
As ‘a synthesis of the design-led approach to urban development’, the spatial master plan was ‘a vital 
framework for development’, and as such ‘a fundamental ingredient in achieving an urban renaissance 
in English towns and cities' (Urban Task Force, 1999: 73). Where it had been implemented, as in 
Barcelona, Rotterdam and Greenwich, it had ‘driven the development process and secured a high 
quality design product’ (ibid). Rather than two-dimensional zoning plans, it was a three-dimensional 
framework that offered ‘a more sophisticated “visual” model’ (ibid). It suggested the shape and quality 
of the outcome, around a selected set of considerations, within fairly clear temporal and spatial 
boundaries, and coordinated by the master planner (Urban Task Force, 1999: 76).  
 
A series of checklists and good practice advice accompanied this campaign for master plans, defining 
their contents (Llewelyn Davies Yeang, 2000) and processes (CABE, 2004: 13). The Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), however, warned that a master plan is not a blueprint 
for design and development but a device for setting the context within which individual projects come 
forward (CABE, 2004: 9). The new generation master plans, therefore, were a framework for promoting 
development, which included marketing a place and creating certainty for the developers to invest. 
Master plans were no longer a vehicle of the welfare state for managing a calculated distribution of 
resources in response to social and economic needs, but a tool for attracting and coordinating economic 
investment, from which other benefits might trickle down. They reflected the re-emerging need for 
coordination and risk management within a radical paradigm shift from social to economic 
considerations.  
 
The regeneration drive which peaked at around the turn of the century, however, did not merely suffer 
from vulnerability to economic fluctuations, but also from overemphasis on selective sectors and 
locations. The market-driven nature of these development projects meant that they would target either 
stronger property markets such as central London, where the reward is high, or where government 
support and subsidy was available, as provided by the urban regeneration and renaissance agenda. 
Globalization fuelled urban vibrancy, but it also led to a growth in social inequality (OECD,2008). 
Concentrating investment in city centres drove the gentrification of these areas, displacing some people 
and activities, and denying funds to those in other locations who were waiting for their turn (Atkinson 
and Bridge,2005; Lees et al,2008). This was a period in which it was naively thought that market 
fluctuations, in the shape of booms and busts, were a thing of the past. However, with the global 
financial crisis of 2007, the building boom ended and master plans were once again seen as inflexible 
tools unfit for a period of economic stagnation and uncertainty. The economic crisis left a large number 
of empty shops, flats and offices, while serious housing shortages were not addressed (Gallagher, 
2016; Ruddick, 2008). 
 
The aesthetic character of these development projects, meanwhile, often drew on international, 
corporate aesthetics with little connection to the locality’s character and context. As the master plans 
were produced by a relatively small number of international consultants, they tended to use a fairly 
limited range of ideas (Rapoport, 2015). As the city centres were dominated by large corporations in an 
economy founded on debt-fuelled consumption in retail and entertainment, their diversity of character 
suffered, to the extent that some are called ‘clone towns’ (NEF, 2010).  
 
The two waves of master planning, therefore, are characterized by a number of similarities and 
differences. Their similarities include their technical character, their alignment with the period of 
economic growth and building intensity, and their limited flexibility to deal with rapid change. The 
technical character, which had previously been critiqued for its lack of democratic responsiveness, once 
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again tended to depoliticize urban development processes. As the cycle of building boom came to an 
end with a major economic crisis in 2007, the master plan once again showed its rigidity, unable to 
adjust to major economic fluctuations. In both periods, economic downturns bring social concerns into 
sharper focus, which may be partially reflected in the revised master plans, but not necessarily 
supported by the dwindling financial resources.  
 
The differences between the two periods, however, are evident in the structural character of each period 
and the way master plans have been used. In the move from the welfare state to neoliberalism, from 
the state-led to the market-dominated urban development, from comprehensive planning to strategic 
planning, and from the urban plan to the urban project, the character of the master plan changed. From 
being an instrument of addressing a wide range of social and economic considerations, it became a 
vehicle of selective economic considerations and a tool for marketing. The problem was not in 
attempting to develop a vision for the future, nor in the deployment of design, but whom it served and 
what it was for. The results of these shifts of emphasis and character have been evident in the nature 
and outcome of the master plans, as exemplified in Sheffield.  
 
2. Reinventing the city of steel: Sheffield city centre master planning  
In comparison to the 1945 Sheffield master plan, which aimed at comprehensive reconstruction after 
the war (Lewis,2013), the new master plans of Sheffield focused strategically on economic recovery 
after deindustrialization. Sheffield had faced a decline in manufacturing employment and to a lesser 
extent population. From the mid-1970s Sheffield lost more than 70,000 (incl. 60,000 in the metal 
industries alone) out of 120,000 manufacturing jobs and its population shrank from 570,000 to 520,000. 
Sheffield’s retail suffered from the national recession of the early 1990s and following the opening of 
Meadowhall, a large suburban shopping mall, in 1990. The overall negative external perception of 
Sheffield was exacerbated by the decline in the aesthetic appeal of the postwar modernist design. The 
City Council made several attempts to change the city’s image, through the construction of a new tram 
system, which opened in 1992, and through investment in sports facilities in part to host the World 
Student Games of 1991, although both left it indebted. These were then challenging conditions in which 
to seek to change the fortunes of the city.   
 
The paper is based on conducting a qualitative case study during the period 2010-2015, which deployed 
an interpretive analysis of primary and secondary data derived from three principal methods. First, it 
involved undertaking a close reading of key documentation, principally the Sheffield City Centre Master 
Plans of 2000, 2008 and 2013, alongside other relevant planning documents and policy and practice 
reviews available in the public domain such as the Sheffield Development Framework of 2009. Second, 
15 expert interviews were conducted with council officers, councillors and strategic stakeholders in the 
process of urban regeneration in the period 2011-12. Additional 5 follow-up interviews were then carried 
out with the key actors in the master planning process in the period 2013-14 after the publication of the 
Sheffield City Centre Master Plan 2013. Third, it involved direct observation of both physical changes 
to the urban fabric, and the use of established and reconfigured public spaces, through regular walks 
around the city centre. Such walks also included ad hoc conversations with citizens; in a few instances 
they were accompanied by the key informants. This multi-method approach allowed the authors to 
examine: planning policies and practices; physical, economic and social outcomes of these practices; 
and the ways in which the processes and outcomes of Sheffield master planning were perceived by the 
key actors and stakeholders. 
 
2.1. City Centre Strategy 1994: A new vision 
One response to the long-lasting economic and physical decline was ‘design-led’, implemented through 
a vision for a comprehensive redevelopment of the city centre in ‘A new city: Sheffield’s City Centre 
Strategy’ of 1994 (SCC, 1994). The Strategy marked three strategic shifts in thinking about Sheffield’s 
recovery: (i) consideration of a successful city centre as the key to economic development; (ii) 
reinstatement of the local state as the main enabler of urban redevelopment, and (iii) the development 
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of a new generation of contemporary master plans. Thus from 1994 onwards the City Council focused 
on the delivery of non-statutory master plans and the elaboration of new visions for the city centre, 
alongside city branding, building investor confidence and real estate management. City Centre Strategy 
1994 set out a broad vision for the regeneration of the city centre focusing on the quality of physical 
environment, multi-modal transport accessibility and improvement of the austere image of the city 
centre through the creation of distinctive urban core quarters and gateways, including a ‘gold route’ 
linking the railway station to the central retail core. The development strategy also helped secure a 
successful bid to the Millennium Commission entitled Remaking the Heart of the City (SCC, 1995) 
comprising £23m funding for an exhibition space on the Gold Route, the Millennium Galleries, alongside 
public realm improvements to the Peace Gardens and Hallam Square (Booth, 2009) (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Peace Gardens, which was given its name after the Second World War, forms an 
important node at the heart of the city.  
 
The vision set out in the City Centre Strategy 1994 was taken up in consecutive planning documents, 
including the City Centre Business Strategy 1996 (Sheffield City Liaison Group, 1996), which defined 
timescales for specific actions and projects at the ‘Heart of the City’. Alongside the successful 
Millennium bid, it helped crystalize certain qualities of space that Sheffield City Council was to pursue 
in the following decades. The Strategy considered the public realm as key both to physical regeneration 
and economic competitiveness, and recognized public arts as a driver for enhancing the qualities of 
public spaces. This built on a focus on creative industries in its economic development strategy. From 
the very beginning the re-invention of the city centre was motivated by a desire to develop an inner-city 
experience economy that would be capable of competing with Meadowhall, the suburban shopping 
mall. In the Town Hall, the design-led regeneration was seen first and foremost as a window of 
opportunity to build a new inner city shopping centre: 
 
‘There was a genuine fear in the city at that time that we might become the first city in the UK 
turned into the American model where – as we have seen in places like Cleveland and Detroit 
- centre just dies and everyone shops in the suburbs. This all started from that real fear of 
losing shops in the city centre. We started to draw up plans to turn that situation around. 
Initially, we couldn’t really compete with the mall purely in terms of retail. We had to look at 
all the other things that make a city centre different from anywhere else in city, the civic 
function, the cultural function, the social function and education, and we identified pedestrian 
access as a key organizing feature. This is how it all started, really.” (Senior regeneration 
manager) 
 
Sheffield was being re-imagined as a ‘welcoming city’, whose revamped townscape and new 
experience economy were to act as a magnet for tourists, students, graduates and business people, 
attracting them to settle, invest and drive technological innovation.  
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Benefiting from a national policy movement to regenerate the English ‘core cities’ as a driver for the 
economic growth of less affluent regions, and from the Objective 1 European Structural Funds, a 
pioneering regeneration company named Sheffield One was set up in February 2000 to coordinate and 
deliver regeneration. Unlike the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC), that had operated from 1988 
to 1995, Sheffield One had neither substantial budget of its own nor extensive planning powers. It was 
an ‘arm’s-length’ body of the Council, and its objective was to exploit synergies by coordinating between 
public and private sector actors and to address opportunities through elaborating strategic master plans. 
 
2.2. City Centre Master Plan 2000: Platform for investment 
Commissioned by Sheffield One, the Sheffield City Centre Master Plan 2000 (Koetter, Kim & Associates 
2000) drew upon earlier strategies, updated their key objectives and set out a time framework for the 
delivery of £1 billion investment in the city centre over the next 15 years. Its vision included four key 
objectives: (i) building a new high technology-based economy; (ii) creating a vibrant city as a centre for 
learning, culture, retail, business, leisure and living; (iii) improving accessibility to the city centre by all 
modes of transport; and (iv) celebrating the public realm. 
 
Master Plan 2000 saw physical regeneration of the city centre as a milestone to the transformation of 
Sheffield into a regional retail hub and one of Europe’s high-tech centres. City centre master planning 
extended to other quarters to accommodate continued investment. The Plan envisaged delivery of so-
called ‘Magnificent Seven’ projects that, apart from the ‘Heart of the City’, included further three 
schemes focusing on remodelling of the public realm for future mixed use development – ‘Station 
Gateway’, ‘City Hall/Barkers Pool’ and ‘West Bar’ – a proposal for a new historic and recreational quarter 
in Castlegate, ‘E-Campus’ for small and middle-sized digital and tech companies, and a ‘New Retail 
Quarter’. The new public realm schemes were imagined as vehicles of economic growth and social 
inclusion (Koetter, Kim & Associates 2000; Jones et al, 2003). 
 
The Master Plan 2000 followed the burgeoning policy and practice of ‘Urban Renaissance’ guides (e.g. 
Urban Task Force, 1999; DETR, 2000a and 2000b; English Partnerships, 2000) and successful 
examples of design-led regeneration from Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and cities across Europe 
of the previous two decades (e.g., Tibbalds, et al. 1990). As such the City Council championed the 
pivotal role that the public realm could play in the reinvention of a city, principally through attention to 
the central core. The Master Plan 2000 concluded that the successful delivery of the network of quality 
public spaces would cause a multiplier effect that would encompass inward investment, buoyant retail, 
inner city housing, and a diverse and inclusive labour market. Issues of justice and equality were 
conceived as an outcome of future economic success: ‘Once the momentum is created, the challenge 
is to ensure that the benefits of this vision reach right out into the most deprived communities within the 
city and beyond to the sub-region’ (Koetter, Kim & Associates 2000: 3). While a booming global 
economy led to a high volume of housing investment, an Urban Design Compendium was 
commissioned to secure the quality of new schemes.   
 
2.3. City Centre Urban Design Compendium 2004: Quality improvement 
The Sheffield City Centre Urban Design Compendium (Gillespies, 2004) was meant to champion 
design-led regeneration and safeguard quality and coherence of urban design in the city centre and 
beyond. It sought to bring together planning and design by translating economic, cultural and social 
goals embedded in strategic frameworks goals into physical transformation. First, the Compendium 
offered a description of the existing and desired character of a particular area and topographical, 
natural, and built environment qualities that were expected to be taken into consideration. Second, it 
crystalized a vision of desired futures for the character areas which championed a sense of place, 
vibrancy and human movement. Third, it put forward design principles and guidelines that comprised 
degrees of integration (recovery / reinvention / reconfiguration of an area), desired architectural styles, 
key natural and industrial heritage themes (water and steel), and a 2-tier palette of colours and materials 
(incl. Bronze, Granite, Stone Mastic Asphalt, etc.) to be used. In order to put these principles into motion 
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an Urban Design Review Panel was set up in 2006.  
 
Although the design guidance of the Compendium was both comprehensive and detailed, the document 
offered somewhat narrow interpretations of urban design: 
 
‘I think Birmingham was the first city to actually develop such a coherent approach in early 1990s, 
we liked it, and we followed that sort of technique, especially where we had residential coming. 
That was to some extent welcomed, I think, by developers and particularly by our colleagues 
from the maintenance side of the Council. Rather than having each urban designer to come out 
with a new form of street furniture, new materials or a different distinctive approach, what we 
said was: ‘we want to keep it all quite simple, so we can look after it – the stone paving, the 
benches, bins, etc. -  long term’. The Urban Design Compendium was rather a consequence of 
this approach than some revolutionary design statement. We wanted to keep the public realm 
consistent, so the whole city centre reads as something that has some coherence and it is 
possible to keep spare parts if it requires repairs.’ (design manager) 
 
This approach, which seems to undermine the embedded aesthetic diversity of a historic city in favour 
of technical considerations, was seen to have been efficient and was consistently used in a number of 
development projects. The Millennium celebratory schemes, favourable Urban Renaissance policies in 
Europe and the UK, and Objective 1 funding from the ERDF provided a financial backbone for getting 
the physical regeneration off the ground and for reimagining the city through the public realm. However, 
by 2006-07 grant funding was running out and the next obvious challenge was to mobilize design to 
knit together places, people and the economy. This required building a bridge between publicly funded 
physical regeneration, on the one hand, and business value and job creation, on the other. 
 
2.4. Master Plan 2008: Beyond physical transformation 
The ultimate objective of the master planning process from 2006 onwards shifted towards broadening 
the focus of Master Plan 2000 both to other parts of the city centre and beyond, and more toward 
economic development: 
 
‘The Master Plan [2000] was wholly absorbed by physical regeneration. The economic bits to 
it, such as development opportunities, investment, building of skills and all the other more 
inclusive holistic approaches were missing. It wasn’t an economic master plan. It was the built 
environment where all priorities went. If you were a part of the Glorious Seven or the 
Magnificent Seven, the priority focus for seven years was with you, but otherwise your route 
was not gold at all.’ (LEP representative) 
 
In the same vein, the Mid-Term Evaluation Report of South Yorkshire Objective 1 Programme (Wells, 
2003) argued that supply-side interventions of the public sector had not been sufficiently met by a 
transformational change in the demand-side. New development policies, therefore, were to shift 
towards securing major private sector investments that would create jobs and reduce the numbers of 
economically inactive and under-employed groups. This policy turn was also reflected in institutional 
design. In 2007 the Urban Regeneration Company ‘Sheffield One’ was merged into a newly created 
City Economic Development Company ‘Creative Sheffield’ whose main objective was to sustain 
economic growth in the time of reductions in public expenditure. 
 
A new master plan, Sheffield City Centre Masterplan 2008 (EDAW, 2008) reviewed and refreshed the 
objectives of Master Plan 2000 drawing upon the Economic Master Plan (Creative Sheffield, 2008) and 
the City Strategy 2006-2010 (Sheffield First, 2007). While earlier planning documents - Strategy 1994, 
Business Plan 1996, and Master Plan 2000 - focused on physical qualities of spaces, Masterplan 2008 
was more concerned with non-physical initiatives in the knowledge economy. The Master Plan claimed: 
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‘The focus on physical development must now shift to development of the city economy and 
the role of the city centre in its structural transformation.’ (EDAW, 2008: 2) 
The Master Plan 2008 aimed at enabling major private investment and opening opportunities for 
economic growth and job creation through the development of office accommodation, a Retail Quarter 
branded as ‘Sevenstone’ and a diversified housing stock. It viewed residential and commercial space 
development and further improvement of the public realm as part of a bigger whole, focused on the 
maximization of synergies between development projects, and was underpinned by an ambition to 
create physical and economic connections within and beyond the city centre. As opposed to its 
predecessor, the Master Plan 2008 offered an overall vision for physical, economic, social and cultural 
development. The biggest challenge, however, rested in the consequences of the economic crisis. 
While the bold economic ambitions of the Master Plan had been elaborated predominantly in 2006-07, 
by the time the Plan was published in 2008 the economic landscape had much altered and they already 
seemed out of reach. 
 
2.5. Master Plan 2013: towards a new managerialism?  
The economic downturn, and the fiscal austerity that followed, hit Sheffield and other catching-up core 
cities in the North of England much harder than the South East and the northern front runners of 
Manchester and Leeds. Private investment had come almost to a complete halt. Much fewer 
development projects were proceeding and some schemes - such as the controversial Urban Splash 
revamp of the Park Hill estate – were suspended or abandoned mid-way (Figure 2). Vacancy rates in 
existing residential and commercial units had significantly risen and there was little evidence for stronger 
demand in the future. Out of the two flagships of the Master Plans 2000 and 2008 ‘Digital Campus’ 
looked stagnant and negotiations between the Council and the developers over the ‘Sevenstone’ retail 
quarter were coming to a dead end. The ambitions of EDAW’s Master Plan relating to office provision 
were halved and job creation targets reduced fourfold (SCC, 2013).   
 
 
Figure 2. Park Hill, a housing estate built by the council in the 1950s and now listed as a historical 
monument, has been partly refurbished as private flats and offices.   
 
The lack of private investment resulted in passing control back to the City Council in many distinct ways. 
The Council decided to review EDAW’s Master Plan 2008 and produce a new refreshed Master Plan 
2013 (SCC, 2013) in house. Creative Sheffield was reintegrated into the economic and marketing 
directorate of the Council. But public regeneration funding further declined and Yorkshire Forward was 
dismantled alongside all other regional development agencies (RDAs): 
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‘The kind of level of public resource is much reduced, the funding regimes that we have 
worked with the European programme we worked with ended, and also Yorkshire Forward 
was abolished by the Government. So one of our main partners just disappeared and hasn’t 
really been replaced.’ (senior regeneration manager) 
 
At the same time a few positive factors came together that helped to innovate the master planning 
process in the absence of private investment. New sources of funding were becoming available that 
started shaping new planning practices.  Heritage Lottery and Grant in Aid shifted thinking towards new 
forms of local authority-community partnerships. The rising consensus across the scales of government 
to work towards new climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies meant that new environmental 
sustainability-focused funding pots became available, and recurrent floods in the city centre helped 
advance a sustainable city agenda. But foremost, new non-fundamental forms of lending to finance 
local authority investment, unrolled by the central government’s New Development Deal and European 
Commission’s JESSICA, enabled Sheffield City Council to increase their borrowing capacity against 
future income. Paradoxically, the US-imported tax incentive financing, which helps local authorities to 
gamble on future tax income and in most places is used to lend on to or de-risk private investment, was 
seen in traditionally managerialist Sheffield as a window of opportunity to invest in public infrastructure, 
public realm and public services. 
 
The new Master Plan 2013 rebalanced priorities between catering for the needs of the private sector, 
local communities and public service. With all opportunities and pitfalls involved, the Council planned 
for re-establishing its role as the key land owner, investor and service provider. The new Master Plan 
saw instilling some forms of bottom-up - but council enabled and managed - creativity of local 
communities. This included enabling temporary uses of vacant spaces, supporting creative start-ups 
and independents, and development of local energy. The Council started negotiating more strategically 
the needs of economic growth with social inclusion and the duty of care for the natural environment, all 
in the context of diminishing funds. 
 
3. A master planned Sheffield? 
The five phases of master planning in Sheffield city centre demonstrate two decades of attempts at 
overcoming economic decline through a strategic focus on the city centre and coordinating the available 
resources of the public and private sector investors. The early phases emphasized the enhancement 
of the city centre’s infrastructure and image, in a design-led process of public realm improvement and 
property development. The later phases displayed a desire to expand these improvements both 
geographically and into a wider range of economic considerations. But this process came to an abrupt 
halt by the economic crisis, hence falling back on the public management of dwindling resources.  
 
The remarkable improvements in Sheffield centre’s visual appeal in the 1990s and 2000s are widely 
acknowledged (Booth, 2009). The consistency of work on the public realm in consecutive city centre 
master plans and detailed design principles helped coordinate the development of a network of 
distinctive public spaces. However, while the Council intended to use design as a holistic ‘tool for 
reinvention of the city, economy and society’ (council officer), the conception of spatial quality laid out 
in the Compendium was heavily grounded in a particular approach to urban aesthetics. This approach, 
which aimed at improving the image of the city centre, was rooted in the long British tradition of 
picturesque, and its more recent manifestation in the Townscape Movement of the 1960s (Cullen 1971), 
which focused on the urban scene as a visual experience (Vescovi, 2013: 158). Rather than linking 
urban spaces to creative industries and high-tech manufacturers (Bell and Jayne, 2003), developing a 
critical approach to the Europeanization of urban living (Vickery, 2007), encouraging participatory 
approaches to design-related decision-making (Punter, 2007) or community development approaches 
addressed in the White Paper (ODPM, 1999), the emphasis was much narrower here.  
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The question is not about the presence or absence of design in the master plans, but about the roles 
which designs and master plans were expected to play, and whether the intended spatial qualities were 
organically linked with the local economic and social needs and capacities. While the public realm-led 
regeneration attracted real estate investment into the city, it is less clear how it helped to support the 
city’s economy. For example, design-led master planning practices could have done more to connect 
with the local creative industries and their production of symbolic goods and services (Bell and Jayne, 
2003). Some opportunities to link the design-led reinvention of the city centre with the design skills 
agenda were lost, and not enough designers, craftspeople and entrepreneurs got a chance to build 
their portfolios and businesses, although a few local creative industries benefitted from public contracts 
for the design and development of public spaces. The process shows a disconnection between the 
design and development of the public realm, cultural policy and creative economy, which prevented the 
germination of longer term possibilities for high value jobs in creative and digital industries. A high 
volume of speculatively produced spaces and a vibrant inner city experience economy could not be 
translated into the durable economic growth of an urban area. Furthermore, the concerted attempts for 
the regeneration of the city centre would not be enough to be a catalyst for the changing fortunes of the 
urban region as a whole. The gap between the patterns of spatial design and property investment on 
the one hand, and the social and economic dynamics of a locality on the other hand would undermine 
the possibility of mutual and sustained linkages between them.  
 
The economic evaluation of the legacy of urban design-led regeneration in Sheffield brings a mixed 
picture. When hard economic indicators are taken into account, there is a strong case for arguing in 
favour of the success of Sheffield’s design- and public realm-led strategies in pursuing economic 
competitiveness in the phase preceding 2008. The city’s economy performed very well in the period of 
1999-2004 with strong, higher than the national average, levels of GVA per capita growth. Sheffield 
was creating 2,000 new jobs a year through inward investment and unemployment fell to approximately 
5% in 2004, just above the national average (GENECON, 2011). New physical and economic policies 
in conjunction with very favourable macroeconomic conditions lifted Sheffield from the depths of 
deindustrialization, brought it back on the growth track, and enabled the modernization of the city’s 
economy (Dabinett, 2005). But Sheffield’s real estate market and the broader city’s economy proved to 
be highly vulnerable to the cycle of economic growth and decline. The failure of Sevenstone following 
2007 was symbolic of this feeling of a ‘bubble’ in the city. The overheated city centre housing 
development industry took a strong hit with the vacancy rates in new units remaining high, while the city 
lacked family housing on the edges. Overall, although ‘Sheffield’s dip was shallower than in some other 
places in the North’ (LEP representative) and earlier physical, symbolic and reputational gains of master 
planning might have helped to decrease the shockwave, the city’s economy significantly 
underperformed in terms of GVA recorded in comparison to the national average between 2008 and 
2013 (SCC, 2013).  
 
The social justice and equality agenda of the design-led regeneration of Sheffield’s city centre 
comprised a set of objectives that were mostly residual to the economic ambitions. This represented a 
major shift for cities such as Sheffield which had previously used public sector investment more directly 
to address social inequality. The social agenda has also proven to be less successful than the economic 
one. Post code-based user surveys show that the new spaces such as Peace Gardens and Winter 
Gardens were unanimously appreciated, and strengthened civic pride and personal identification of 
Sheffielders with the place (Holmes and Beebeejaun, 2007) (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Winter Gardens, which houses more than 2,500 plants from around the world, was 
completed in 2003. 
 
But Sheffield remains one of the most divided cities, with almost a quarter of households living in poverty 
that is heavily clustered in northern and eastern wards (IMD, 2007). The master planning promise to 
mitigate poverty through the labour market remains largely unfulfilled. In contrast, the rebranded city 
centre quarters with their unique identities bring together homogenous middle class communities of 
students and young professionals (MacLeod, 2002). Moreover, the speculative residential 
development, which contributed to driving housing prices up and thus exacerbating affordability 
problems, has left the (post-)crisis city with high numbers of empty middle-class homes in the city centre 
and unsolved housing problems elsewhere. The planned replacement of the Castle Markets with a 
tourist attraction and a major revamp of the Park Hill estate, which with unprecedented public subsidy 
is being gentrified, shows the widening social, cultural and symbolic gap, and the lack of attention it has 
received in these master plans.  
 
Critical reflection on the development visions for the city and the engagement of local communities in 
such a reflection constitute the weakest points of the master planning process. Although community 
participation was mobilized in urban design strategies and public consultations, it happened in a limited 
way, without stressing them as condicio sine qua non for planning applications. The City Council in any 
case found itself operating a planning system prescribed by central government in which it had much 
reduced powers to refuse planning applications. As a result, while the master planning and design 
processes have been marked with a great deal of consensus among Sheffield’s elites and planning 
professionals, the views of Sheffielders have been to a large extent absent from the debate both in 
relation to the plans and also with regard to development proposals. In this respect Sheffield shared 
many flaws of design-led regeneration with other cities. Its master planning has focused on the product 
rather than on the process and has lacked extensive public input in the early stages of the plan-making 
process, serving as a vehicle of delivering property development within a context of an expert-driven 
corporate aesthetics of what constituted ‘good’ development without critical reflection on urban 
citizenship (Julier, 2005). One of the problems of such an approach rests in the fact that Sheffield’s 
master planning was, as that of many other UK cities, outsourced to a transnational class of mobile 
urban regeneration professionals who, by nature, have weaker insights into local contexts and needs. 
Their commissioned labour time on master planning projects is usually very limited, which makes them 
more likely to turn to off-the-shelf solutions. However, their work on Sheffield’s MP2000 and MP2008 
was moderated by an in-house urban design team - that had become increasingly rare in the UK – who 
did address some of public concerns expressed in the consultation process. The master planning has 
also become far more sensitive to local needs and contexts since Sheffield’s in-house team reclaimed 
the visioning role from the consultants, although a post-crisis, weakened urban economy and dwindling 
public finances have undermined their ability further to develop and implement such visions.     
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Conclusion 
Judging by the evidence from the past century, the rise and fall of master planning has paralleled the 
periods of boom and bust in urban development, and the changing relationship between the state and 
the economy. Master plans have been employed when the economy has boomed, the state has been 
involved in steering it, development projects have proliferated and the need for coordination has been 
felt. In the periods of decline in development activity, however, the central motive for such engagement 
fades away, and the master plan loses its rationale, becoming a rigid obstacle or an irrelevant document 
on the shelf.  
 
Analytically, it is possible to separate the master plan as a tool from the quality and character of its 
outcome, as different master planning processes may generate completely different outcomes in 
different cities. Nevertheless, some of the intrinsic qualities of the master plan may be responsible for 
the resulting shortcomings. Master plans have been used as a tool of coordinating property 
development and managing uncertainty in a market-dominated context; as such, they have played a 
strategic organizing role. However, their development-oriented nature and their fixed spatial and 
temporal focus make them vulnerable to the fluctuations of the market. Their strategic nature has meant 
giving priority to some groups, activities and places at the expense of the others; subsequently, their 
relatively narrow focus in cities with wide-ranging problems would make them ineffective in addressing 
these problems.  
 
Master planning has remained a useful tool in the armoury of urban planners and designers, and has 
undoubtedly helped in positively transforming the city centre of Sheffield. Compared with previous eras, 
however, local governments find themselves with fewer tools, of finance and regulatory power in 
particular, with which to enact their visions. Master plans can also help in realizing the economic 
potential of the urban environments, both positively to affect the image of a city with regard to public 
investment and as a stimulus for private sector investment in real estate within the transformed spaces, 
although not necessarily much beyond. However, the dynamics of property development may not 
always be intertwined with other economic sectors; and the top-down nature of ‘master’ planning could 
remain at odds with the democratic imperatives of public engagement and the social needs of the urban 
society.  
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